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Abstract 
In this paper I provide a methodological critique of the conventional method for 
assessing the impact of investment shortfalls and other contributors to unfunded 
pension liabilities, and offer a methodologically sound replacement with substantive 
policy implications.  The conventional method – simply summing the annual actuarial 
gain/loss figures over time – provides a neat, additive decomposition of the sources of 
the rise in the Unfunded Accrued Liability (UAL).  In doing so, however, it implicitly 
assumes that in the counterfactual exercise, amortization would adjust dollar-for-dollar 
with the interest on additional UAL.  That is, even if the total (and average) shortfall from 
covering interest is substantial, the marginal shortfall is assumed to be zero.  This is not 
how contribution shortfalls arise under funding formulas typically used by public plans in 
the United States.  Using the actual funding formula in the counterfactual – with 
contribution shortfalls on the margin -- leads to much higher estimates of the UAL 
impact of investment shortfalls than the conventional method.   The reason is that there 
are large interactions over time between investment shortfalls and marginal contribution 
shortfalls.   The conventional counterfactual implicitly assumes away these interactions.  
The resulting additivity is alluring, but illusory.   
 
The conventional method also leads to untenable results on other UAL-drivers.  Most 
striking is the implication that the cumulative UAL impact of pension obligation bonds 
(POB’s) is no different from the initial impact of receiving the proceeds, independent of 
the return (actual or assumed) on those proceeds.    
 
The underlying problem with the conventional framework is that it has emerged without 
careful attention to the counterfactual scenarios it is meant to address.  This paper 
provides explicit and internally consistent counterfactuals to better understand the 
conventional method and its flaws, as well as the reasons for using instead the actual 
amortization formula in the counterfactual.  Mathematical methods are used to 
illuminate the theoretical issues that lie behind any simulations.   
 
The analytical results are illustrated empirically with an adapted version of the actuarial 
history of the Connecticut State Teachers’ Retirement System (CSTRS), FY00-FY14.  
The example is instructive because it is a highly underfunded system, notable for its 
high (and unreduced) assumed rate of return (8.5 percent), as well as its use of $2 
billion in POB proceeds to reduce the UAL in FY08, just before the market crash.  
                                                          
* This paper will be presented at the Fall Research Conference of the Association for Public Policy and 
Management, November 12, 2015, Miami, FL.  A precursor of this paper was presented at the 
Association for Education Finance and Policy, 40th Annual Conference, February 26, 2015, Washington, 
DC.  I would like to acknowledge the early support of StudentsFirst and EdBuild for my work on 
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Introduction and Summary 
 
What has been the impact of investment shortfalls from the assumed return on public 
pension funds, over extended periods?  How has this impact compared with that of 
shortfalls from liability assumptions and contribution shortfalls?   These questions have 
been framed as the relative contributions of the investment, liability, and contribution 
shortfalls to the rise of a plan’s Unfunded Accrued Liability (UAL).  That framework, in 
turn, has been based on the actuarial gain/loss statement in a plan’s annual valuation 
report, which parcels out the year’s rise in UAL among the UAL-drivers.  In the 
conventional multi-period UAL analysis (Munnell, et. al., 2015), these one-year gain/loss 
attributions are simply added up over time.  In this paper, I closely scrutinize the 
methodological basis for this procedure and find it wanting.  I propose a 
methodologically sound replacement with substantive policy implications. 
 
The critical step in the conventional methodology is the last step -- adding up the annual 
gain/loss components of the rise in UAL over a period of years to arrive at a cumulative 
breakdown of the multi-year rise in UAL.  While this procedure provides a neat, additive 
decomposition of the rise in UAL, it does so by effectively assuming away important 
interactions between investment shortfalls and contribution shortfalls, through its implicit 
assumption regarding the counterfactual behavior of amortization payments. 
 
Specifically, the method implicitly assumes that the one-year impact of any UAL-driver 
elicits in the following year a dollar-for-dollar increase in amortization payments for the 
interest on the additional UAL.  That is, even if the total (and average) shortfall from 
covering interest is substantial, the marginal shortfall is assumed to be zero.  This is not 
how contribution shortfalls arise under funding formulas typically used by public plans in 
the United States.  In these formulas amortization is proportional to the UAL (and its 
interest), so the average and marginal shortfall (if there is one) is the same. 
 
Using the actual funding formula in the counterfactual can lead to much higher 
estimates of the UAL impact of investment shortfalls than the conventional method.   
The reason is that there are large interactions over time between investment shortfalls 
and marginal contribution shortfalls.   The conventional counterfactual implicitly 
assumes away these interactions, with a resulting additivity that is alluring, but illusory. 
 
It is important to get the impact of investment shortfalls right, not only for academic 
reasons, but also for practical policy purposes.  In the aftermath of the 2007-09 market 





average, Biggs, 2015).  Several years later, despite generally strong market returns, the 
question returns, as in many cases the cuts have proven insufficient to prevent a further 
rise in UAL’s. Thus, pension funds – and the general public – need to understand the 
historical impact of investment shortfalls to better inform the choice of rate reduction 
going forward.   By underestimating the past impact, the conventional method implies a 
low-ball answer to the question of how much to cut the assumed return. 
 
The conventional method also leads to untenable results on other UAL-drivers.  Most 
striking is the implication that the cumulative UAL impact of pension obligation bonds 
(POB’s) is no different from the initial impact of receiving the proceeds.   If a state 
issues POB’s to “pay down,” say, $2 billion in a fund’s UAL (as did Connecticut for its 
teachers’ retirement system in 2008) the plan’s annual gain/loss statement will record a 
$2 billion reduction in UAL due to the POB.  In the conventional multi-year UAL 
analysis, the cumulative impact of that POB remains at $2 billion for every year 
thereafter.  In this framework, there is no impact attributed to the POB of the assumed 
or actual return on the proceeds invested in the fund (let alone the debt incurred and 
debt service paid by the state or other issuer of the POB’s).   This treatment of POB’s in 
the conventional multi-year UAL analysis is, perhaps, the canary in the coal mine, 
raising questions of the attribution to the other UAL-drivers as well.    
 
The underlying problem with the conventional framework is that it has emerged without 
careful attention to the counterfactual scenarios it is meant to address, such as, “What if 
investment returns had met assumptions, but other factors had remained unchanged?”  
In general, such scenarios take as the baseline the time series of all UAL-drivers at their 
actual values (generating the actual rise in UAL), and assesses the counterfactual 
impact of setting the series of each driver, one at a time, at the value that generates no 
rise in UAL.  This is what policy-makers have in mind for the “what-if” scenarios.     
 
Concretely, it is the specification of the UAL-drivers that defines the exercise.  Formally, 
that specification defines what is exogenous.  In the conventional decomposition (based 
on the annual gain/loss statement), a key driver is the total dollar amount of the 
contribution shortfall – the difference between interest on the prior year’s UAL and the 
current year’s amortization.  Taking this as exogenous for a one-year change is 
innocuous, but not for multiple years.  For if so, then current amortization varies dollar-
for-dollar with the interest on the prior year’s UAL.  That is, the implicit assumption for is 
that in each year, amortization equals interest on the counterfactual UAL for the prior 
year, minus the current year’s actual contribution shortfall, impounded in an exogenous 
constant term.  In this way, the total contribution shortfall reproduces the actual, but the 
marginal shortfall is set to zero.  In actual practice, the marginal and average shortfall (if 
there is one) are typically the same.  This is the crux of the problem. 
 
A second issue with the conventional framework is that the counterfactual time series of 





rectify this, treating asset values as endogenous.  Otherwise, the counterfactuals are 
not internally consistent.  Although this has no effect on the measured impact of 
investment shortfalls, it can significantly improve the measured impact of POB’s. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  First, I review the analytics behind the 
conventional method.  I then briefly discuss the implications for this procedure of 
smoothed vs. market valuation.  Next, I dissect the key issue of the implicit designation 
of what is exogenous under the conventional method, and how its counterfactual model 
of amortization is at odds with actual formulas.  I then informally draw the implications 
for the conventional method’s under/overestimation of the impact of investment 
shortfalls and other drivers.  Before continuing, I correct the exogenous treatment of 
asset values so that the analysis proceeds with internally consistent counterfactuals.  
 
Next, to fully illuminate the implications of what is taken as exogenous, I mathematically 
contrast the two extremes:  the conventional framework’s exogenous treatment of the 
total contribution shortfall vs. exogenous amortization payments.  I then illustrate my 
proposed method of using actual amortization formulas, which, in the case of 
underfunding, lies between the two extremes previously analyzed. To complement our 
understanding of the varying impact of investment shortfalls on the UAL under the 
different amortization assumptions, I show that the difference is mirrored in the impact 
on cumulative contributions, with the total impact – paid (amortization) and not-yet-paid 
(UAL) -- essentially invariant.  Finally, for completeness sake, I fill out the accounting for 
POB’s, including the debt and debt service of the bonds’ issuer.   
 
It is important to note that when using the amortization formulas, the UAL impact of 
individual drivers will exceed the actual rise in the UAL, in the case of underfunding.   
That is, there are substantial interactions that are effectively assumed away under the 
conventional framework.  The reason is that if investment shortfalls generate additional 
UAL, the interest on that additional UAL will, in underfunded systems, also be 
underfunded, adding further to the UAL.  These dynamic interactions between 
investment shortfalls and contribution shortfalls will disrupt additivity.  I argue that the 
adding-up problem is more aesthetic than policy-relevant.  It is more important to get the 
individual impacts right, taken one at a time, since that is the usual policy interest.  If the 
policy interest is in the simultaneous impact of multiple drivers, that can be readily 
modeled, reflecting the interactions, rather than effectively assuming away the 
interactions so that the individual impacts artificially add up.  
 
Throughout the paper, I supplement the analytical results with illustrations adapted from 
the Connecticut State Teachers’ Retirement System (CSTRS), FY00-FY14.   The 
CSTRS case is of interest in its own right for several reasons.  The system’s pension 
funding difficulties rival those of more well-known cases such as California, New Jersey, 
Illinois and Pennsylvania.  Unlike other systems, it has not reduced its assumed rate of 





Thus, it is an interesting case to illustrate the effect of using a more sound method of 
assessing the impact of investment shortfalls on the rise in UAL, as well as the more 




The Sources of the Rise in UAL:  The Conventional Method 
 
The starting point is the decomposition of the annual rise in UAL presented in a plan’s 
valuation report.  The sources of the rise can be categorized into (i) investment 
shortfalls of market return from assumed return; (ii) shortfalls on the liability side due to 
changes in and deviations from actuarial assumptions, as well as benefit changes; (iii) 
contribution shortfalls relative to interest on the UAL;1 and (iv) other events, such as the 
issuance of POB’s (pertinent for CSTRS, as well as other plans). 
 
Let us consider this decomposition formally, with some slightly simplified math:2 
 
(1) UALt ≡  Lt - At 
 
(2) Lt = (Lt - Let|t-1) + Let|t-1 = (Lt - Let|t-1) + (1+r*)Lt-1 + NCt – Bt 
 




At = assets3 
Lt = accrued liabilities 
Let|t-1 = expected accrued liabilities in period t, as of t-1, under actuarial assumptions 
NCt = normal cost 
Bt = benefit payments 
AMTt = employer contributions in excess of NC, credited toward amortization 
r*, rt = assumed and actual return on investment4 
POBt = proceeds from pension obligation bonds issued in period t. 
 
Substituting and simplifying, we have the standard actuarial gain/loss result, 
decomposing the change in the UAL from t-1 to t: 
                                                          
1 Munnell, et. al., 2015 rightly point out that this is the UAL-relevant contribution shortfall, rather than the 
commonly cited shortfall between actual contributions and the ARC, as the ARC may not cover interest. 
2 I assume cash flows and annual liability accruals are made at the end of the year, rather than the usual 
actuarial assumption of mid-year, thus excluding the associated half-year interest on each. 
3 These are market asset values, as are the return on assets, rt.  The implications of using smoothed 
asset values, while tangential to the subject of this paper, are briefly discussed below. 
4 We take the assumed return r* as constant, which is accurate for CSTRS.  For cuts in the assumed 






(4) Δt-1,tUAL = (Lt - Let|t-1) + (r* - rt)At-1 + (r*UALt-1 - AMTt) -  POBt. 
 
The first term on the RHS is the loss from liabilities exceeding expectations (i.e. adverse 
deviations from liability assumptions, changes in those assumptions, or changes in 
benefits); the second term is the loss from investment returns falling short of 
expectations; the third term is the loss from amortization payments’ failure to cover 
accrued interest on the UAL; and the fourth term is the reduction in UAL from POB’s.5    
 
For the one-year change in UAL, this is an attractive formulation: it unambiguously 
allocates the change among liability shortfalls, investment shortfalls, contribution 
shortfalls, and POB’s in a way that adds up to the actual change in the UAL.  
Specifically, note that there are no interactions among these drivers of the rise in the 
UAL that would disrupt additivity; some terms depend on prior values of UAL and A, but 
these can be taken as pre-determined.  Thus, each source represents a well-defined 
counterfactual that is independent of one another:  “How would the UAL in period t (and 
its rise from period t-1) differ from the actual if in period t investment assumptions had 
been met [or liability assumptions had been met, or amortization had covered interest, 
or no POB’s had been issued]?”   If all four conditions held simultaneously, the rise in 
UAL would be zero.  Since there are no interactions, the separate counterfactual 
impacts sum to the actual rise in the UAL. 
 
How, then, to allocate the rise in UAL over multiple periods, from period 0 to T?  The 
conventional approach (put forth by Munnell6 and her colleagues at the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College) is to simply add up each component of (4), 
year-by-year, to allocate the total change in the UAL among its various sources:   
 
(5) Δ0,TUAL = Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 + Σt=1T(r*UALt-1 - AMTt) - Σt=1TPOBt 
 
              =      Δ0,TUALL:Σ  +    Δ0,TUALr:Σ     +         Δ0,TUALC:Σ      + Δ0,TUALB:Σ. 
 
I label each of the four terms as the contribution to the rise in UAL from each of the four 
UAL-drivers, as attributed by the conventional method: Δ0,TUALL:Σ, etc., where Σ 
denotes the simple summation from the annual gain/loss statements.  We use C in the 
third term to denote contribution shortfalls, (r*UALt-1 - AMTt).  Using this framework, the 
Munnell team estimates that 60.4 percent of the rise in UAL from 2001 to 2013 for the 
150 plans in Boston College’s Public Plans Database was due to annual investment 
shortfalls, the second term of (5), Δ0,TUALr:Σ.   
 
                                                          
5 Standard UAL accounting omits the POB debt itself, carried by another party (e.g. the state).  I will 
provide a full accounting in a later section, below. 





I will illustrate the conventional method and alternatives to be considered with the case 
of the Connecticut State Teachers Retirement System, CSTRS.7   I use an adaptation of 
the time series for FY00-FY14.  The main difference between this adaptation and the 
actual series of CSTRS is the use of market asset values rather than smoothed asset 
values – a difference with consequences discussed below.  I also exclude the midyear 
return for cash flows and accruals from the growth in assets and liabilities, respectively, 
a relatively minor difference, to keep the math simple and focused on the issues at 
hand.8   The net result of these adaptations is a rise in the UAL of $8.4 billion from FY00 
to FY14, rather close to the actual rise of $8.6 billion. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the decomposition of the $8.4 billion rise under the conventional 
method.  I find that the conventional method would attribute $5.0 billion (about 60 
percent) to investment shortfalls (red line) from the assumed return of 8.5 percent.   
Contribution shortfalls (purple line) account for another $3.3 billion (around 40 percent).  
I have broken out liability losses into those due to deviations from or changes in 
assumptions and the FY08 benefit hike for COLA’s.9  These were both offset by the $2 
billion POB, also issued in FY08.  (The dotted lines will be discussed later.) 
   
[FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
In Figure 1, note that the cumulative impact of the POB is unchanged after its FY08 
impact:  the solid orange line is flat at -$2 billion.  Similarly, the cumulative impact of the 
FY08 benefit enhancement is unchanged thereafter:  the brown line is flat.  These are 
the most visible manifestations of the fact that under the conventional method, the one-
year impact of any contributor to the rise in UAL, as specified in (4), is also the 
cumulative impact thereafter, in (5).   There is no further impact from the interest on the 
initial UAL impact or shortfalls from the assumed return.  The implicit assumptions of the 
conventional method that underlie this result will be explained below. 
 
 
Measured Impact of UAL-Drivers Under Smoothed vs. Market Asset Values  
 
In many respects, the use of smoothed vs. market asset values makes little difference 
over long periods; the change in asset values and UAL is not much different for CSTRS 
over the period in question.  However, the attribution of that rise can differ materially 
between the investment and contribution shortfalls.  In the CSTRS case, I find that 
                                                          
7 This study uses the series of biennial valuation reports from FY02 – FY14. 
8 One other difference is the exclusion of an actuarial adjustment made in FY08 for the interest on the 
integration of funds previously segregated for the COLA. 
9 Specifically, the FY08 legislative package (PA 07-186) which authorized the POB’s also changed the 
terms of the COLA and converted it from a fund-contingent benefit to a guaranteed one.   This resulted in 
a $1.151 billion hike to the accrued liability, effectively spending over half the proceeds of the POB’s, 





smoothed asset values swings about 7 additional percentage points of the rise in UAL 
away from the impact of contribution shortfalls to the impact of investment shortfalls. 
 
The reason is not hard to explain.   Over the period in question, smoothed asset values 
have, on average, exceeded market asset values for CSTRS, and, consequently, the 
smoothed UAL’s have, on average, been lower than the market UAL’s.  This means the 
assumed interest on the UAL was also lower under smoothing, and, thus, the 
contribution shortfall from assumed interest was lower, too.   Conversely, since 
smoothed asset values were higher, so was the assumed investment income, and, 
therefore, the investment shortfall was greater.  
The point here is that the allocation of the rise in UAL is sensitive to smoothing.   The 
difference in average asset values is about 4 percent over this period, but this 
corresponds to an average difference in UAL’s of about 7 percent and that results in the 
7 point swing in the attribution between investment and contribution shortfalls.  Although 
the asset-smoothing mechanism may well serve its designated purpose of smoothing 
out contributions, it can significantly distort our understanding of the rise in the UAL.   
Consequently, I focus on market values in the analysis of this paper. 
 
 
What is Exogenous Under the Conventional Method? 
 
To understand the underpinnings of the conventional method, one must consider 
closely the question of what is exogenous.  The unstated premise of the decomposition 
of any variable’s growth among the drivers of that growth is that the series of drivers are 
to be considered exogenous.  That is, if Δ0,TY is to be attributed to the time series of 
drivers Xat, Xbt …, t = 1,…,T, then any counterfactual on those drivers must be 
considered independent of one another.10   Specifically, the portion of Δ0,TY attributed to 
the driver series Xat is answered by the question, “How much different would Δ0,TY have 
been, had Xat taken the counterfactual values Xat* that would have contributed nothing 
to Δ0,TY, instead of its actual values Xat, holding the other drivers constant at their actual 
values?”  To pose this “what if” question, one must assume that each series of drivers 
can be set independently of the others in the counterfactual, i.e. that each driver can be 
considered exogenous. 
 
In the present case, this means that the conventional decomposition of UAL growth 
takes as exogenous the series of drivers (Lt - Let|t-1), POBt, (r* - rt)At-1, and Ct ≡ (r*UALt-1 
- AMTt).  As stated above, the variable Ct denotes the contribution shortfall.   The key 
assumption implicit in the conventional allocation (5) is that the series of contribution 
shortfalls Ct is exogenous.  That is what allows one to interpret each term of (5) 
pertaining to the other drivers as the answer to the question, “How much different would 
                                                          
10 This is not to say that their impact on Y must be independent of one another, only that the values of the 
X’s can be considered independent in the counterfactuals.   The question of interactions in their impact on 





Δ0,TUAL have been, had (say) (Lt - Let|t-1) taken the counterfactual values of zero that 
would have contributed nothing to Δ0,TUAL (i.e. liability assumptions had been met), 
instead of its actual values (Lt - Let|t-1), holding the other drivers constant at their actual 
values, including Ct?”   
 
That is, these counterfactuals -- implicit in the conventional method -- take the series of 
contribution shortfalls Ct as exogenous at the actual observed levels, independent of the 
counterfactual values assigned to the other drivers, and (importantly) their 
corresponding impact on UAL.  That means in the counterfactuals for the other drivers’ 
impact, it is implicitly assumed that  
 
           (6) AMTt = r*UALt-1 - Ct, 
 
such that Ct is held constant at the actual level and AMTt varies dollar for dollar with the 
interest on the UAL, as it reflects the counterfactual impact of the other drivers. 
 
The form of (6) – implicit in the conventional method’s counterfactuals for the other 
drivers – is important to understand.  Amortization in period t is linear in the interest on 
UAL, with coefficient one (i.e. varies dollar-for-dollar) and a constant term equal to the 
negative of that year’s actual total dollar contribution shortfall.  Figure 2 graphs equation 
(6), with the counterfactual values of AMTt on the vertical axis and the counterfactual 
values of r*UALt-1 on the horizontal.  Equation (6) is parallel to the 45° line (AMTt = 
r*UALt-1), shifted down by a constant equal to the actual contribution shortfall, Ct. 
 
[FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
This differs significantly from the typical amortization formula, under which amortization 
is proportional to the UAL and its interest.   That is, unlike (6), the typical formula has 
zero constant and generates contribution shortfalls (surpluses) through a coefficient on 
the interest that is less than (greater than) one.  Specifically, the formula commonly 
employed is “level percent [of payroll].”  With assumed growth rate g, the basic form is:11 
 
(7) AMTt = UALt-1(r*-g)/{1 – [(1+g)/(1+r*)]N}, 
 
where N is the remaining amortization period (closed or open).  We can then write 
 
(8) AMTt = αtr*UALt-1, where αt = [(r*-g)/r*]/{1 – [(1+g)/(1+r*)]N}. 
 
                                                          
11 As before, we simplify by ignoring the actuarial conventions regarding mid-year cash flows.  Another 
departure from typical actuarial practice is that AMT will often be based on 2 (or more) years lagged UAL, 





As stated above, this differs from (6) by virtue of a zero constant and a coefficient on 
interest αt that can be less than (greater than) one.12  For example, with r* = 0.085 and g 
= 0.0375, αt < 1 for N ≥ 19.  That is how contribution shortfalls are typically generated.  
Figure 2 graphs equation (8).  It is a clockwise rotation of equation (6), through their 
common point, which is the actual value of (r*UALt-1, AMTt). 
 
Munnell’s team finds that contribution shortfalls are more common than not,13 but the 
mechanism by which those shortfalls are generated is misrepresented by (6), as 
embedded in the conventional method.   Both (6) and (8) model the same total shortfall, 
(r*UALt-1 - AMTt), and the same average shortfall, (r*UALt-1 - AMTt)/r*UALt-1 for the 
actual values AMTt and r*UALt-1.  However, they differ importantly in the marginal 
shortfall for the counterfactual values, Δ(r*UALt-1 - AMTt)/Δ(r*UALt-1) – one minus the 
slope of the counterfactual line.  Under (6) it is zero, and under (8) it is (1 - αt).  This is 
the crux of the problem with the conventional method – the main source of its 
misleading assessments of driver impacts -- as I will explain. 
 
In some cases, budgeters do not actually fund the amortization formula in place, but 
instead contribute “what they can afford.”  This is an elusive concept, to be sure, 
governed by tax revenues and non-pension expenditures that are considered non-
discretionary.  But it seems clear that in such cases the amortization payments are even 
less responsive to the UAL than the amortization formula.  In effect, AMTt is exogenous, 
corresponding to the horizontal line in Figure 2. 
 
 
What are the implications of Taking Ct as Exogenous? 
 
Before completing my formal analysis, I can sketch the implications of the conventional 
method’s treatment of Ct as exogenous, i.e. modeling AMTt by (6) instead of (8).  
Consider the measured impact of investment shortfalls, liability shortfalls and POB’s.14 
 
The main issue here is investment shortfalls.  In short, if αt < 1, the conventional method 
will underestimate the impact of investment shortfalls (and, conversely, if αt > 1, it will 
overestimate the impact).  The reason is that under the conventional method, if an 
                                                          
12 The coefficient αt can vary over time as plans change assumptions on g or N changes (either a policy 
change for the open interval, or, automatically, with the passage of years for a closed interval).  Note that 
αt cannot be less than one with g = 0, i.e. “level dollar” amortization.  Conversely, with open interval 
amortization, αt can be less than one indefinitely with sufficiently high values of g and N, and that has 
been the case for some plans with 30-year rolling horizons, as Munnell, et. al. point out. 
13 They calculate that contribution shortfalls account for 23.7 percent of the rise in UAL’s from 2001 to 
2013 for the 150 plans in Boston College’s Public Plans Database. 
14 The measured impact of the series of contribution shortfalls itself is independent of the counterfactual 
modeling of AMTt using (6) or (8) or any other variant.   That impact is measured by the difference 
between the actual Δ0,TUAL, where all drivers take their actual values, and the counterfactual Δ0,TUAL 





investment shortfall occurs, generating an increment to the UAL and to the interest on 
the UAL the following year, the amortization is implicitly assumed to cover the 
incremental interest dollar-for-dollar, adding nothing to the contribution shortfall.  If, 
instead, the true amortization process only partially covers additional interest (αt < 1), 
then there will be an additional contribution shortfall, induced by the investment shortfall. 
 
This can be understood in terms of equation (5).  Under the conventional method, 
investment shortfalls generate UAL impacts directly through the second term of (5), 
Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1, with no indirect impact through the third term, Σt=1T(r*UALt-1 - AMTt), 
which remains unchanged by implicit assumption (6).  But if amortization is actually 
governed by (8) with αt < 1, then the marginal contribution shortfall is (1 - αt) > 0, so 
there will be an additional contribution shortfall induced by the investment shortfall, 
reflected in the third term of (5).  In short, there is a significant interaction between 
investment shortfalls and an amortization regime that generates contribution shortfalls.  
This disrupts additivity, but that is the way amortization formulas work.  To implicitly 
assume away the interactions by virtue of (6) yields an appealing additivity, but at the 
price of underestimating the impact of investment shortfalls in a regime of underfunding.   
 
The conventional method’s treatment of Ct as exogenous also explains the puzzling 
time pattern of other drivers’ impact.  Consider the FY08 COLA enhancement that 
raised the UAL that year by $1.15 billion.   As Figure 1 shows (brown line), under the 
conventional method, the cumulative impact remains unchanged thereafter.   There is 
no further measured impact from the potential accumulation of interest on the additional 
UAL because the implicit assumption is that additional amortization covers that interest.  
If, instead, the amortization regime does not fully cover additional interest (αt < 1), then 
there would be additional contribution shortfalls, induced by the benefit enhancement.   
Again, the potential interaction between the benefit enhancement and an amortization 
regime that underfunds on the margin is assumed away.  The same is true for any given 
year’s deviation from liability assumptions. 
 
This logic also explains the one-shot time pattern of POB’s impact.   As Figure 1 
illustrates, under the conventional method, the reduction in UAL from the POB proceeds 
is recorded in the year of issue ($2 billion in FY08 for CSTRS) and remains unchanged 
in the cumulative accounting going forward.  One might think that the subsequent 
earnings on the proceeds of the POB contribute to the further diminution of the UAL 
attributable to the POB.  Indeed, that definitely seems implicit in the arguments heard 
for POB’s, namely the arbitrage gains from the returns r* that are assumed to be earned 
on the proceeds.  Again, the explanation of those returns’ omission from the subsequent 
impact of the POB lies in the conventional method’s assumption for amortization.  As 
the POB reduces the UAL (by, say $2 billion), the interest on the UAL is also reduced 
and, under the conventional method, amortization payments are reduced dollar-for-






There is, however, another aspect to the POB impact that is also missed by the 
conventional method, due to another problem, unrelated to amortization.  That is the 
inconsistent treatment of asset values in the second term of (5) (investment shortfalls) 
for the counterfactuals, including the one for POB’s.  Before continuing the formal 
analysis of the treatment of amortization, I need to fix this problem, so that the 
counterfactuals are internally consistent with respect to asset values. 
 
Consistent Counterfactuals with Exogenous Contribution Shortfalls 
 
To construct consistent counterfactuals, we want to examine the impact of each of the 
UAL-drivers while simultaneously satisfying system (1) – (3), which implies (4) and (5).   
The counterfactuals answer the question: “What is the impact of each UAL-driver, 
assuming the other drivers are unchanged?”    
 
Specifically, we start with each of the four series of UAL-drivers – (Lt - Let|t-1), (r* - rt), Ct 
≡ (r*UALt-1 - AMTt), and POBt, t = 1,…T – set to their actual values, so the baseline 
UALT is the actual (as is its rise from UAL0).  We then take each driver one at a time, 
setting it to a series of zeros, and compare the resulting counterfactual UALT to the 
actual (or, equivalently, compare its rise from UAL0) to find that driver’s impact.15    
 
In doing so, there is a further flaw implicit in the conventional method, and that involves 
the term (r* - rt)At-1 in (5).  Although this series – the dollar value of the annual 
investment shortfall – is implicitly treated as exogenous in (5), the intent behind this 
component is clearly to assess the impact of the shortfall in the investment return, (r* - 
rt).   That is, the “what if” counterfactuals for the non-investment shortfalls compare the 
UAL if one of those series of drivers equals zero, which means the lagged asset series 
At-1 cannot be taken as exogenous -- as implied by the term Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 in (5).  That 
is, in setting (say) the (Lt - Let|t-1) series at zero and comparing the resulting value of (5) 
with the actual value of (5), one cannot legitimately hold the second term constant. 
 
Instead, the counterfactual values of At-1 must be modelled as in (3), using the 
counterfactual values of AMTt.  Here I maintain the conventional method’s implicit 
assumption of exogenous contribution shortfalls, Ct ≡ (r*UALt-1 - AMTt), which implies 
the amortization regime (6).  That is, internal consistency is satisfied by modeling the 
                                                          
15 An alternative set of consistent counterfactuals (call them zero-base) would start with each of the four 
series of UAL-drivers set to a vector of zeros, so there is no rise in UAL, as shown in (5).  We would then 
take each driver one at a time, setting it to the actual series to find the impact on UAL.   These 
counterfactuals answer the question:  “What is the impact of each UAL-driver at its actual value, 
assuming the other drivers are zero?”  Arguably, the version in the text is the “what if” that policy people 
have in mind.   One might also argue that these comprise a more compelling set of counterfactuals than 
the zero-base ones, since the zero baseline is so far removed from the actual. The implications of the 





counterfactual values of At using (3) and (6), and of course the counterfactual series 
UALt that is implied by the assumed values of the drivers.16 
 
So how do the UAL-impacts under these consistent counterfactuals compare with the 
uncorrected conventional method?   The answer is that the impact of the investment 
shortfall equals that of the uncorrected method, but the others do not. 
 
The result can be seen by examining the counterfactuals with (5).   For the investment 
shortfall, denoting the counterfactual by superscript r:C (for exogenous C), we have: 
 
(5r:C) Δ0,TUALr:C  = [Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 + Σt=1TCt - Σt=1TPOBt]  
  -  [Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - r*)Ar:Ct-1 + Σt=1TCt - Σt=1TPOBt] = Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 = Δ0,TUALr:Σ 
 
The first bracketed term is the actual rise in UAL, using actual values of the drivers, and 
the second bracketed term is the counterfactual rise in UAL, using actual values for all 
drivers except rt = r*.  The difference is Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1, with actual values of At-1, as in 
the conventional allocation.  The endogeneity of the series Ar:Ct-1 under this 
counterfactual is irrelevant, since it is multiplied by zero.  Thus, Δ0,TUALr:C = Δ0,TUALr:Σ. 
 
The endogeneity of At-1, however, does matter for the other drivers, notably the POB: 
 
(5B:C) Δ0,TUALB:C  = [Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 + Σt=1TCt - Σt=1TPOBt]  
                       - [Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - rt)AB:Ct-1 + Σt=1TCt] ≠ - Σt=1TPOBt = Δ0,TUALB:Σ, 
 
because the series AB:Ct-1 ≠ At-1.  Specifically, in the year of the POB, if it had not been 
issued, the counterfactual value of AB:Ct would be reduced by the full POB amount.  
Therefore, in period t+1 the POB’s absence would have reduced any investment 
shortfalls from (r* - rt+1).  That is, to state the result directly, the POB’s favorable UAL 
impact in period t is partially offset in t+1 by the investment shortfalls on the proceeds.   
 
CSTRS provides a dramatic example.  Immediately following the POB issue of $2 
billion, the fund lost 17.84 percent in FY09, 26.34 percentage points below the assumed 
return.  Thus, the investment shortfall on the $2 billion was $527 million that year, 
offsetting a good portion of the prior year’s UAL reduction from the POB proceeds.  This 
can be seen directly on Figure 1, comparing the FY09 point on the dotted orange curve 
(representing Δ0,TUALB:C) with the point on the solid orange curve for Δ0,TUALB:Σ, which 
                                                          
16 I hold (NC – B)t to their actual values for all of the counterfactuals. This would not be a strictly valid 
assumption for counterfactuals where the benefit structure differs from the actual, but in cases where 
benefit changes are minor – as in CSTRS over the period in question – this assumption should not be 
terribly problematic.   Note also that I am assuming the difference (NC – B)t is fixed at its actual value, a 





lies along the -$2 billion line.   The result is intuitive, but the point here is that it is not 
reflected in the conventional method.17    
 
Similarly (albeit less dramatically), for the liability shortfalls, we have  
 
(5L:C) Δ0,TUALL:C  = [Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) + Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 + Σt=1TCt - Σt=1TPOBt]  
                            -  [Σt=1T(r* - rt)AL:Ct-1 + Σt=1TCt - Σt=1TPOBt] ≠ Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) = Δ0,TUALL:Σ, 
 
because, again, the series AL:Ct-1 differs from At-1, due to the endogenous amortization.   
Specifically, in the year following any liability shortfall, if that shortfall had not occurred 
the counterfactual assumes that AMT would be reduced by the interest on the UAL that 
would have been occasioned by that shortfall.  This would reduce AL:Ct+1 and, therefore, 
in period t+2 it would reduce any investment losses from (r* - rt+2).  The difference, 
however, is nearly imperceptible in Figure 1, between the solid and dotted liability 
curves.  Similarly, there is a slight difference between the impact of contribution 
shortfalls under the consistent counterfactual and the conventional allocation, as 
indicated by the dotted purple line in Figure 1.  
 
I consider the dotted lines (where they differ from the solid ones) to be the correct 
impact of the UAL drivers, under the maintained assumption that Ct is exogenous.  It is 
worth noting that the property of additivity is violated here.  That property depended on 
each term in (5) equaling the difference between the actual Δ0,TUAL and the 
counterfactual value when one of the drivers was set to zero.  This no longer holds 
when At’s endogeneity is recognized.   The non-additivity may be empirically small 
under exogenous Ct (the dotted lines in Figure 1 sum to 101.3 percent of the total rise in 
UAL).  But additivity does require inconsistent counterfactuals and will be more 
significantly violated when the assumption of exogenous C is replaced. 
 
The construction of consistent counterfactuals and their comparison with the 
conventional method18 has been, perhaps, tedious, given the lack of dramatic 
                                                          
17 Note, however, that if r = r* the cumulative UAL impact of the POB is again unchanged beyond the 
initial impact. The result in (5B:C) pertains to investment shortfalls, not the interest on the POB proceeds.  
Under the assumption of exogenous Ct, that interest is still assumed to be offset by reduced amortization. 
This comment applies also to the interest on liability shortfalls.   
18 For the zero-base counterfactuals, introduced in a previous note, the results are the mirror image of the 
counterfactuals presented in the text:  the impact of investment shortfalls differs from the conventional 
allocation, but the other impacts are the same.  Consider, for example, the liability shortfalls. Under the 
zero-base method (where the baseline Δ0,TUAL = 0), we examine the counterfactual value of (5) where 
the liability shortfalls, (Lt - Let|t-1), hold their actual values while 0 = (r* - rt) = Ct = POBt, t = 1,…T.  Denoting 
the result with the superscript L:z (for zero-base liability counterfactual), we have: 
Δ0,TUALL:z  = Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1) = Δ0,TUALL:Σ, since the other three terms of (5) are set to zero by construction. 
That is, the conventional allocation of the rise in UAL to liability shortfalls corresponds to the zero-base 
counterfactual.  The endogeneity of At does not affect this result.  That is because its value in the second 
term of (5) is irrelevant to both the baseline and the liability counterfactual, with 0 = (r* - rt) in both.  The 





differences, except for the investment shortfalls on the POB.  However, it is important to 
get the counterfactual right, not only for its own sake, but also to determine that the 
inconsistent treatment of asset values is not the main problem.  That is the exogeneity 
of Ct and the treatment of amortization.  In the remainder of this paper, analyzing this 
problem, I adopt the consistent counterfactuals, i.e. At as treated as endogenous.    
 
 
Exogenous AMTt Contrasted with Exogenous Contribution Shortfall, Ct  
 
I return to my main theme, the counterfactual treatment of amortization.  As we have 
seen, in analyzing the conventional UAL allocation, (5), the implicit assumption is that 
AMTt varies dollar for dollar with r*UALt-1 under the various counterfactuals that 
generate endogenous UAL’s (i.e. the target of the exercise).  That is, the implied 
counterfactuals are of the form, “What would be the impact on UAL if (say) investments 
had met the assumed return, and amortization payments had correspondingly adjusted 
dollar-for-dollar to the interest on the resulting UAL’s?”  As I have argued, this will 
underestimate the impact of investment shortfalls for typical amortization formulas with 
αt < 1.  To get a deeper, more formal understanding of why this is so, in this section, I 
will consider the case of exogenous AMTt.  To put it in context of (6) and (8), this is the 
extreme case where the counterfactual AMTt does not vary at all with the interest on 
counterfactual changes in UAL.  In terms of Figure 2, we are simply rotating the line all 
the way around the actual values of AMTt and r*UALt-1, from (6) to (8) to the actual AMTt 
line itself, where the slope is zero and the marginal shortfall is one.  I examine this 
extreme case in detail because it generates clear analytical results that will serve to 
clarify the intermediate case (8), illustrated in the next section.  As mentioned above, it 
may also be relevant to the case where budgeters do not fund the amortization formula, 
but simply contribute “what they can afford.” 
 
Specifically, there are two points that will emerge from this analysis.  First, under this 
formulation interest is reflected in the UAL impact of the drivers such as (Lt - Let|t-1) and 
POBt, unlike the conventional allocation.  That is, the interest ensuing from the initial 
UAL impact accrues for additional UAL impact instead of going to amortization 
payments.  This is a direct consequence of assuming counterfactual AMTt does not vary 
at all, let alone dollar-for-dollar with interest on the UAL.    
 
Second, there are significant interactions among the UAL-drivers for the impact on the 
UAL.  That is, if we add up the individual counterfactual UAL impacts, the total may far 
                                                          
result differs from the conventional allocation:  Δ0,TUALr:z  = Σt=1T(r* - rt)Ar:zt-1 ≠ Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1 = Δ0,TUALr:Σ, 
since the endogenous series Ar:zt-1 (generated by (3) with AMTr:z instead of actual AMT) will not equal the 
actual series At-1.  In principle, that can matter, when rt ≠ r*.  In practice, this may not matter much.  In our 
adapted CSTRS example, with exogenous Ct, the UAL impact of investment shortfalls is 58.4 percent of 






exceed the actual rise in UAL.  Thus, if our goal is to allocate the rise in UAL among its 
drivers, we may face a large adding-up problem.   On the other hand, if the policy 
interest is the impact of each driver taken one at a time, these are the estimates that we 
want.  This issue will persist (in attenuated form) under our preferred alternative (8), as 
discussed in the next section, so this section explains the problem in its purest form.   
 
I will derive the reduced form expression for Δ0,TUAL.  Specifically, I will solve for the 
series At and UALt to express Δ0,TUAL solely in terms of the series: (Lt - Let|t-1), rt, AMTt, 
NCt, Bt, and POBt, given the initial conditions A0 and UAL0.   To do so, the system (3) – 












+ 𝒗𝑡 ,   
 
where 𝑴𝑡 = [
(1 + 𝑟𝑡) 0
(𝑟∗ − 𝑟𝑡) (1 + 𝑟
∗)
] and 𝑣𝑡 = [
𝐴𝑀𝑇 + (𝑁𝐶 − 𝐵) + 𝑃𝑂𝐵
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(9) ∆0,𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿 = [(1 + 𝑟
∗)𝑇 − ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
] 𝐴0 + [(1 + 𝑟
∗)𝑇 − 1]𝑈𝐴𝐿0
+ ∑ [(1 + 𝑟∗)𝑇−𝑡 − ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝜏)
𝑇
𝜏=𝑡+1
] [𝐴𝑀𝑇𝑡 + (𝑁𝐶 − 𝐵)𝑡 + 𝑃𝑂𝐵𝑡]
𝑇−1
𝑡=1
+ ∑ (1 + 𝑟∗)𝑇−𝑡[(𝐿𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡|𝑡−1




For the actual values of all the variables (as denoted by the absence of superscripts), 
the sum in (9) is equal to the sum in (5), but the counterfactuals (other than the one for 
contribution shortfall) will differ, because here AMTt will be taken as exogenous instead 
of Ct ≡ (r*UALt-1 - AMTt).  
  
One can readily find the counterfactual impact from (9) for liability shortfalls and POB’s.  
For liability shortfalls, (Lt - Let|t-1), simply take the difference between the actual Δ0,TUAL 
given in (9) and the value it would take with (Lt - Let|t-1) = 0.  Since everything else in (9) 
is unchanged (exogenous or pre-determined), the result is straightforward: 
 
∆0,𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿





where the superscript AMT denotes its exogeneity in the counterfactual.  Here, the UAL 
impact of liability shortfalls includes the cumulative interest (at assumed rate r*), unlike 
the conventional framework where no interest is attributed to liability shortfalls, 
Δ0,TUALL:Σ = Σt=1T(Lt - Let|t-1).  That is because in the conventional framework, with 
exogenous Ct, AMTt responds to cover the interest on liability shortfalls.  Conversely, 
with AMTt exogenous, the liability shortfalls have no impact on amortization.  In effect, 
the assumption of exogenous AMTt reallocates the interest on the UAL impact from 
amortization (under exogenous Ct), to the UAL instead.   
 
The difference can be seen in Figure 3, which depicts the impact on UAL of selected 
drivers,19 under exogenous Ct, exogenous AMTt, and (for reference in the next section) 
exogenous αt.  For all cases, I depict the impact under consistent counterfactuals 
(endogenous asset values).  The UAL impact of the CSTRS benefit change in FY08 
(brown curves) illustrates the difference between exogenous Ct and exogenous AMTt.  
The dotted line, reproduced from Figure 1, shows the cumulative impact after FY08 was 
essentially unchanged20 from the initial impact, under exogenous Ct because 
                                                          
19 Not shown, to maintain legibility in the figure, are the UAL impact of deviations from liability 
assumptions and of the contribution shortfall.   However, the latter is the same under exogenous AMTt 
and exogenous Ct (as well as exogenous αt, discussed below) since, in all cases, we are comparing the 
actual UAL with the UAL under the assumption that AMTt = r*UALt-1. 
20 It is exactly unchanged under the conventional method, but is slightly changed under consistent 





amortization is assumed to cover the additional interest.  As the dashed curve shows, 
under exogenous AMTt, the impact grows with accrued interest at the assumed rate r*.  
 
[FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
Similarly, it is straightforward to show that the reduction in the UAL due to the POB will 
include the investment return, at the actual rate, rt: 
 
∆0,𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿






− 𝑃𝑂𝐵𝑇 . 
 
As we saw in Figure 1, under the conventional method, the initial impact persisted 
unchanged.  Under consistent counterfactuals with exogenous Ct, the overall impact 
shrunk after FY08, reflecting the investment shortfalls, relative to r*, on the POB 
proceeds.  This is shown in the dotted orange curve of Figure 3, reproduced from Figure 
1.  Under exogenous AMTt, depicted in the dashed orange curve of Figure 3, we can 
again see the strongly negative return in FY09 shrinking the initial impact.  Overall, 
however, the impact (i.e. reduction in UAL) grows over the period, as the actual return, rt 
has been generally positive, albeit less than r*.  The difference is that under the 
conventional frameworks’ exogenous Ct, AMTt is reduced to offset the assumed interest 
on the reduced UAL; with exogenous AMTt, the POB occasions no such reduction in 
contributions, so the reduction in UAL is greater. 
 
I turn now to our main focus, the impact of investment shortfalls.  The counterfactual 
value of Δ0,TUAL, is found by setting rt = r* in (9).  This zeros out the first and third terms 
and leaves the other terms unchanged, under exogenous AMTt.  Thus, the difference 
between the actual Δ0,TUAL and its counterfactual value is the first and third terms: 
 
∆0,𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿




+ ∑ [(1 + 𝑟∗)𝑇−𝑡 − ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝜏)
𝑇
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This UAL impact is simply the compounded difference between (1 + r*) and (1 + rt) over 
the T-year period, as applied to the initial assets and the annual cash flows (all of which 
are held exogenous at the actual levels).21   
 
The UAL impact under exogenous AMTt is depicted for the CSTRS example by the 
dashed red line in Figure 3.  It is dramatically higher than the conventional estimate, 
                                                          
21 There is an additional term for the cash flows for period T.  This is not affected by rT, so it is the same 





under exogenous Ct, depicted by the dotted red line (reproduced from Figure 1):  $12.0 
billion vs. $5.0 billion. 
 
Equation (9) can be used to illuminate the difference between the UAL impact of the 
investment shortfall under exogenous Ct and AMTt.  The difference is in the 
counterfactual value of AMTt in the last term of (9).  Under exogenous Ct, the 
counterfactual value of AMTt is given in (6), specifically here, AMTr:Ct = r*UALr:Ct-1 - Ct.  
Thus, Δ0,TUALr:C can be written as the difference between the actual value of (9) and the 
counterfactual value of (9) with rt = r* and AMTr:Ct.22  Specifically, Δ0,TUALr:C has the 
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The third term is negative, since the counterfactual values of AMTt are reduced under 
(6) (exogenous Ct) when rt = r* reduces the UAL’s.  Thus, Δ0,TUALr:AMT (exogenous 
AMTt) exceeds Δ0,TUALr:C (exogenous Ct) by Σt=1T (1+r*)T-t(AMTt - AMTr:Ct) =  
Σt=1T (1+r*)T-t r*(UALt-1 - UALr:Ct-1).  This represents the cumulative value (with interest, as 
of period T) of the amortization payments that are assumed, under exogenous Ct, to 
cover the additional interest on UAL from the failure of investment to meet the assumed 
returns, r*.  Under exogenous AMTt these additional payments would not have been 
made, so the full impact of the investment shortfalls would fall on UAL, instead of being 
offset, as under the conventional method. 
 
As Figure 3 suggests, adding up the UAL impacts of each driver under exogenous AMTt 
well exceeds the conventional estimates and, hence, the actual rise in UAL – about 
double in the case of CSTRS.   Why is there this big adding-up discrepancy?  The 
answer is (by definition) that there are large interaction effects.  Concretely, the 
important interactions here are between the impact of the investment shortfalls and a 
regime of underfunding.  If investment shortfalls raise UAL, but the funding formula does 
not adjust amortization for the ensuing additional interest (or does not fully adjust, as in 
(8)), then there is a further rise in UAL from the subsequent underfunding.  Thus, if we 
add up the UAL impacts one at a time (especially investment shortfalls and contribution 
shortfalls) we will find a total that is much larger than taking them all together. 
 
                                                          
22 The result is equivalent to that given in (5r:C) [Σt=1T(r* - rt)At-1] but the derivation from (9) is more readily 





So what are we to make of the adding-up problem?  In my view, the answer is “not too 
much.”  The end-goal of a policy-relevant exercise is to evaluate useful counterfactuals, 
not necessarily to parcel out the total rise in UAL in a fashion that adds up.  Indeed, if 
we get a solution that adds up for uninteresting counterfactuals – especially ones that 
are misunderstood -- we may in fact be misinforming the user.  If the user’s interest is 
the impact of (say) a high assumed rate of return, we should use the right counterfactual 
to answer that simple question.  If the user’s interest is the impact of multiple drivers 
taken together, then one should simply use that joint counterfactual, which will properly 
handle the interactions.       
 
To repeat, none of this discussion is meant to argue in favor of treating AMTt as 
exogenous in our counterfactual analyses, except in cases where funders simply 
contribute “what they can afford,” instead of funding the formula.  However, the same 
issues arise when AMTt is governed by the formula, albeit in attenuated form.  I have 




Exogenous Amortization Factor, αt  
 
Instead of assuming that Ct or AMTt is exogenous, it is more natural to assume that the 
actual amortization formula in use is exogenous.23  As discussed above, amortization 
formulas typically result in payments that are proportional to the interest on the UAL, 
with a factor αt, as given in (8).  If so, then taking the formula as exogenous is 
equivalent to taking αt as exogenous.   Thus, if one is willing to assume that the formula 
is of the proportional form, one need not delve deeply into the formula’s intricacies, but 
simply take the actual αt ≡ AMTt/r*UALt-1 as our exogenous series. 
 
The “what if” exercises for investment and liability shortfalls and POB take αt as 
exogenous at the actual level and model the counterfactual AMTt using (8).  In this way, 
the estimated impact of the UAL-driver under consideration factors in a proportional 
AMT response to changes in the UAL interest, rather than a dollar-for-dollar response or 
zero response.24  As shown in Figure 2, if αt < 1 (underfunding), the counterfactual AMT 
formula lies between the other two counterfactuals examined, exogenous Ct and AMTt.   
Thus, it is not surprising that the results of this method lie between the two other 
methods.   Specifically, the solid lines in Figure 3 take as exogenous the series of αt’s 
                                                          
23 That said, it is not unheard of for plans to change their amortization formula in response to adverse 
developments, such as investment shortfalls. 
24 The “what if” exercise for contribution shortfalls compares the actual UAL under the actual series αt with 
the no-shortfall series, α* = 1 (analogous to comparing the series rt and r* for investment shortfalls).  As 





derived from our adapted version of CSTRS.  Taken at face value (though see the 
caveats in the note below), αt has averaged about 0.6 over the period FY01-FY14.25   
 
These results – the solid lines in Figure 3 – represent my preferred method for 
estimating the UAL impact of each driver, taken one at a time.  Most notably, the impact 
of investment shortfalls (with the superscript notation r:α, to denote exogenous αt) is 
$7.3 billion instead of $5.0 billion under the conventional method.   Again, this result is 
due to replacing the implicit counterfactual assumption that AMTt varies dollar-for-dollar 
with the interest on the resulting impact on UAL.   The more realistic assumption, that 
AMTt varies at the actual historical proportion αt, provides a much more credible and 
useful estimate for policy-makers of the UAL impact of investment shortfalls.    
 
Adding up the impacts of all UAL-drivers exceeds the actual rise in UAL, due to the 
interactions discussed earlier.  As previously argued, the adding-up goal is not of direct 
policy relevance.  If the goal is to assess the impact of all drivers taken together, then 
that can be directly modeled:  the result will reflect the interactions and will, 
tautologically, equal the actual rise in UAL.  The conventional methodology, in effect 
assumes away the interactions by virtue of an untenable implicit assumption regarding 
amortization.26  The individual impacts add up, but they are not of policy relevance.   
 
 
The Impact of Shortfalls on Cumulative Contributions and UAL 
 
Another impact of interest from the UAL-drivers is their impact on cumulative 
contributions.  That is, we are not only interested in the impact of these drivers on 
payments-yet-to-be made – the UAL – but also the impact on payments that have been 
made – the amortization.  This is an important impact and one that differs under 
exogenous Ct, AMTt, and αt.  I will compare here the impact on cumulative amortization 
and UAL of investment shortfalls and other drivers under the different assumptions.  
                                                          
25 My adaptation differs from the actual CSTRS calculations in manners that can be substantive. The 
differences include the 2-3 year lag between amortization and UAL (due to CSTRS’ biennial valuation 
schedule) and smoothed vs. market valuation.  Moreover, the reason αt < 1 for CSTRS is different from 
the discussion of (7)-(8).  Unlike most plans, CSTRS divides up its UAL into separate pieces and 
amortizes them separately.  For the main piece, the remaining amortization period (closed) is now short 
enough to make αt > 1, but there is also a significant piece of negative amortization, which is amortized 
over a shorter period, and that renders the overall ratio of amortization to interest less than one.  Thus, 
the appropriation here of the overall αt’s “as if” the formula was proportional is solely for illustrative 
purposes.   Note also that when the period of negative amortization ends (in FY22), net amortization 
payments will jump and, barring any change in the formula, the overall αt will exceed 1.  The same feature 
characterized the Public School Employees’ Retirement System of Pennsylvania, and when the period of 
negative amortization ended, there was a huge (and predicted) spike in amortization payments that has 
caused great difficulty (see Costrell and Maloney, 2013, especially Figure B-2). 
26 It would be equally misleading to “fix” the α-based impacts to force them to add up.  The usual such 
“fixes” are: (i) scaling down all figures; and (ii) adding drivers one at a time, in an arbitrary order, instead 





The result is that the total impact is virtually invariant, but the split between paid and 
unpaid impact varies by assumption. 
 
As we have seen, the counterfactuals embed within them the assumed behavior of 
AMTt, depending on what is assumed to be exogenous:  Ct, αt, or AMTt itself, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.   Thus, for the counterfactual on investment shortfalls (i.e. where r 
= r* and all other drivers are at their actual values), we have, under the conventional 
method (exogenous Ct) from (6): 
 
(6r:C)               AMTr:Ct = r*UALr:Ct-1 - Ct. 
 
This generates a series of impacts of the investment shortfalls on amortization 
payments, the difference between the actual and the counterfactual, AMTt - AMTr:Ct = 
r*(UALt-1 - UALr:Ct-1).   To put these amortization impacts on a common footing with the 
UAL impacts, period by period, one calculates their cumulative value, with the assumed 
interest r*.  That is, one calculates the asset value of the series of amortization impacts, 
with the following result by year T: 
 
          Σt=1T(1+r*)T-t(AMTt - AMTr:Ct) = Σt=1T (1+r*)T-tr*(UALt-1 - UALr:Ct-1). 
 
This term appeared (in its negative value) in (10) above, and represented the difference 
between the UAL impact of investment shortfalls under exogenous Ct and exogenous 
AMTt.  It is represented in Figure 4 as the $7.0 billion blue bar in the first column.  The 
total impact of investment shortfalls – UAL plus cumulative amortization – is $12.0 
billion, the same under exogenous Ct and exogenous AMTt (the third column in Figure 
4).  Since (by definition), there is no amortization impact under exogenous AMTt, the 
$7.0 billion blue bar in the first column is the difference between the UAL impacts under 
exogenous Ct and AMTt, as stated above.  
 
[FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
For my preferred model, exogenous αt, the $12.0 billion total impact is split between 
$7.3 billion impact on UAL (previously depicted in Figure 3) and the $4.7 billion impact 
on cumulative amortization, represented by the blue bar in the 2nd column of Figure 4.  
In short, the conventional method -- with exogenous Ct – implicitly attributes a 
substantial portion ($2.3 billion in this example) of the total impact of investment 
shortfalls to amortization instead of UAL.  That is, the conventional method implicitly 
assumes that much more of the impact has already been paid for than the amortization 
formula would imply, so the UAL impact is that much smaller.  More precisely, the 
counterfactual scenario is that without the investment shortfalls, the amortization 
payments would have been $7.0 billion lower, instead of the $4.7 billion implied by the 
amortization formula, so the UAL would have been only $5.0 billion lower, instead of 






Similar observations apply to the impacts on the UAL and cumulative amortization of 
benefit hikes and liability shortfalls.  Thus, the 2nd and 3rd triplets in Figure 4 are similar 
to the 1st triplet, but on reduced scale.  The same pattern holds for POB’s, but of the 
reverse sign, as shown in the 5th triplet.   
 
For contribution shortfalls – depicted in the 4th triplet -- the counterfactual amortization 
assumptions do not matter.  They pertain only to the other counterfactual impacts.  The 
UAL impact of the contribution shortfall is offset by the reduction in amortization – by 
definition – so the total impact is essentially zero. 
 
One might be tempted to dismiss the impact of investment shortfalls and other UAL-
drivers on cumulative amortization as a matter of little significance since, after all, this 
has already been paid.  But this impact is not totally benign.  It means that some of the 
costs have been shifted from the cohort that incurred them to a later cohort, creating 
some generational inequity in doing so.  In other words, the split of the impact between 
paid (cumulative amortization) and yet-to-be-paid (UAL) is really a split between 
generational inequity already imposed and generational inequity to come.   
 
To summarize, the conventional method understates the impact of investment shortfalls 
in two ways.  Using the CSTRS example, the impact on UAL is understated at $5.0 
billion instead of $7.3 billion.  In addition, the conventional method ignores the $4.7 
billion impact on cumulative amortization, and the attendant inequity that has already 




Accounting for Pension Obligation Bonds 
To complete the picture for CSTRS and other plans that have relied on POB’s, one 
should include the POB debt itself.   Although POB’s are typically issued by the state, 
rather than the pension plan, for the taxpayer both the UAL and POB debt are liabilities.  
Indeed, the full liability is understood in pitching POB’s, since they are sold as an 
arbitrage play, borrowing at one rate and investing in the plan, with assumed return r*.    
 
In the case of CSTRS, the State Treasurer estimated the interest at 5.88 percent over 





invested in CSTRS.27  Since the bonds were issued in FY0828, I estimate that the return 
on CSTRS was 6.37 percent through FY14, well below the assumed 8.5 percent, but 
greater than the 5.88 percent calculated average over 25 years.  However, the first two 
years of interest payments were also borrowed, adding $266 million to the bond issue, 
for a total of $2.277 billion (including issuing costs of $11 million).  In addition, the debt 
service payments are highly back-loaded, so the outstanding POB debt continues to 
rise until FY22 – see Figure 5.29 
 
[FIGURE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
It is fairly straightforward to add the outstanding POB debt to the UAL and to calculate 
the counterfactual if the POB’s had not been issued.  The result is depicted in the 
orange POB line of Figure 6.  Since the initial POB issue was $2.277 billion and only 
$2.0 billion went to pay down the UAL, the FY08 figure is positive $0.277 billion instead 
of negative $2.0 billion.  The FY09 figure rises further, due to the large investment 
losses that year.  Since then the figure has drifted down, due to generally good 
investment returns, but remains in positive territory as of FY14:  the outstanding POB 
debt of $2.333 billion outweighs my estimate of the UAL impact, -$2.088 billion.30   
 
To summarize, comparing Figures 6 and 1, the main differences from the conventional 
method are:  (1) the inclusion of the POB debt; and (2) the substantially higher estimate 
of the UAL impact of investment shortfalls, due to the more credible counterfactual of 
amortization. 
 





In this paper I have offered a methodological critique and replacement with substantive 
implications for assessing the impact of investment shortfalls and other UAL-drivers.  
The conventional method of calculating the UAL impact over time – simply summing the 
annual actuarial gain/loss figures -- implicitly assumes that in the counterfactual 
                                                          
27 State Treasurer Denise L. Nappier, as quoted by Alicia Munnell, et al., “Pension Obligation Bonds:  
Financial Crisis Exposes Risks,” Center for Retirement Research, January 2010, p. 3.   The actual bond 
issue was quite complex – 15 current interest bonds (i.e. no principal paid until maturity) and 6 capital 
appreciation bonds (i.e. no principal or interest paid until maturity) of different maturities and rates.  
28 Authorized by P.A. 07-186, codified in Sec. 10-183qq of Chapter 167a, “Teachers’ Retirement System.” 
29 The yearly outstanding POB balance is reported in the Annual Information Statement, State of 
Connecticut, February 28, 2014, revised as of December 8, 2014, p. II-9.   The annual sum of debt 
service payments from the 21 bonds is not disclosed, but can be computed from the information given in 
the initial POB disclosure, April 16, 2008. 
30 Adding in the cumulative value of amortization payments saved and POB debt service paid makes the 





exercise, amortization would adjust dollar-for-dollar with the interest on the UAL, unlike 
the proportional adjustment of typical amortization formulas.  As a result, this method 
implicitly attributes much of the investment shortfall’s impact to the cumulative value of 
amortization instead of the UAL.  This can lead to a substantial underestimate of the 
UAL impact, compared to that implied by actual amortization formulas.  In cases where 
the amortization formula is not funded, and contributions are simply what the budgeters 
“can afford,” the underestimate is likely more pronounced, since the amount budgeters 
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Figure 1: ΔUAL, Conventional Method, Ct Exogenous. CSTRS, FY00-FY14
adapted from CSTRS: market asset values, without midyear return on cash flows and accruals
Dotted lines denote consistent counterfactuals 
(asset values endogenous), 
where they differ from conventional method.   

















 Figure 2:  Counterfactual AMTt as Function of Counterfactual r*UALt-1 










45° line, AMTt = r*UALt-1 
(6) AMTt = r*UALt-1 - Ct 



















































































Figure 3: ΔUAL, AMTt vs. Ct vs. αt Exogenous. CSTRS, FY00-FY14









































Figure 4:  Impact on UAL and Cumulative Amortization.  Ct vs. αt vs. AMTt exogenous.   
adapted from CSTRS, FY00-FY14.











































































































































Source:  Annual Information Statement, State of Connecticut, February 28, 2014;  author's calculations  
Figure 5:  CSTRS POB outstanding debt and annual debt service

















































































Figure 6: ΔUAL + POB debt, αt Exogenous, CSTRS, FY00-FY14
adapted from CSTRS, supplemented by State of Connecticut Annual Information Statement.
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